



Exhortation to the Path of Happiness¹

[1] ²[H.2; Kh. 177; Y. 47] That happiness is an aim that every man desires (*yatashawwaq*) and that everyone who progresses toward it does so only because it is a certain perfection is too well known to need explanation. Every perfection and every aim that man desires is only desired because it is a certain good³ and therefore necessarily chosen (*mu'thar*). Since the aims that are desired [Kh. 178] because they are chosen goods are many, happiness is the most advantageous (*ajdā*) of the chosen aims. It is evident that among goods, happiness is the greatest good [Y. 48] and that among chosen things, it is the most perfect of all aims toward which man strives.

Insofar as chosen goods include: (1) those which are chosen in order to attain something else, such as exercise and taking medicine, and (2) those which are chosen for their own sake, it is evident that those which are chosen for their own sake are more preferable and more perfect than those which are chosen for the sake of something else. Moreover, those which are desired for their own sake include: (2a) those which are sometimes chosen for the sake of [obtaining] something else. [H. 3] An example of this is knowledge; [Kh. 179] for we may sometimes choose it for itself and not for the sake of something else and sometimes we may choose it in order to obtain wealth by means of it, or some other thing that power or knowledge allows us to obtain; and (2b) it includes that which is always chosen for itself and is never chosen for the sake of

¹H. = ed. Hyderabad (no editor mentioned), 1346 H.; Kh = ed. Khalifāt, Amman: 1987; Y = Āl-Yāsīn, Beirut, 1985.

² I have inserted Āl-Yasin's paragraph indicators for ease in reference.

³ See Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. T. Irwin (henceforth N.E.), 1094a1ff: "the good has been well described as that at which everything aims."

something else. This is more choice-worthy, perfect, and good than that which is sometimes chosen for the sake of something else.

[2] When we have seen that if we have attained happiness we do not need to make efforts [to attain] any other aim, it is evident that happiness is chosen for its own sake and never [Y. 49] for the sake of anything else. From that it is clear that happiness is the most choice-worthy, greatest, and most perfect of goods. And we also see that when we have obtained it we do not need anything else. What is like this is most suitable to be [deemed] [Kh. 180] sufficient in itself.

It can be confirmed from this discussion that every man believes that happiness is only what appears to him [to be happiness] or what he conjectures [to be happiness]. For some are of the opinion that wealth is happiness and others are of the opinion that happiness is in something else. ⁴ Everyone believes that what he thinks is happiness without qualification is the most choice-worthy, greatest, and most perfect good, for the rank of happiness among the goods is such. And if this is the rank of happiness and if this is the ultimate end of human perfection, whoever chooses to attain it for himself must have a path to it and things by which it is possible to attain it.

[3] Let us begin by saying that the conditions that man has in his life include that from which neither praise nor blame ensues and that from which [Y. 50] praise or blame ensues.⁵ [H.4] Man does not attain happiness [Kh. 181] by conditions from which praise or blame do not ensue but those by which he attains happiness are in general those conditions of his from which praise and blame ensues. The conditions he

⁴ See N.E. 1.1. 1095a16-19; N.E. X.6.1176b1-5. See also al-Fārābī's *Philosophy of Plato*, par. 1 and *Philosophy of Aristotle*, par. 1.

has from which praise and blame ensue are three: (1) acts which the instrumental body members need to use, such as standing, sitting, and kneeling, and seeing and hearing; (2) affections (*‘awāriḍ*)⁶ of the soul such as desire, pleasure, joy, anger, fear, desire, mercy, jealousy and so forth; (3) judgment (*tamyīz*) of the mind. These three or some of these are what man cannot be free of at any time in his life.

Man is either praised or blamed for every one of these. Blame cleaves to him when they are unseemly (*qabīḥa*) and praise cleaves to him when they are seemly (*jamīla*). Blame cleaves to him from accidents of the soul when they not as they should be and praise when they are as they should be. Blame cleaves to him from his judgment when he has bad judgment and [Kh. 182] praise cleaves to him when he has good judgment.

[Y. 51] Good judgment is when man acquires the conviction (*i‘tiqād*) of truth or gains the faculty to judge what is presented to him; and bad judgment when he does not become convinced of the impressions (*āthār*) he learns, whether true or false. So we need to explain how is the path whereby our acts will be seemly and how what affects our souls will be as it should, and by which path we will acquire good judgment.

[4] First of all one must know that seemly acts may belong to man by happenstance and that he can carry them out without [Kh. 183] their actions being voluntary. Happiness is not attained by seemly acts when they come from man in this way, but belong to him [H. 5] voluntarily and by choice; nor [do they belong to him] when the acts are voluntary with regard to some things and at some times; rather, he

⁵ See N.E. 1.3.1103a.

must choose the seemly in everything he does and at every moment of his life.

However, man may choose what is seemly in everything he does, not because of what is seemly itself but because of it he will attain wealth or something else. Happiness will not be attained by what is seemly when it is not sought for itself. Happiness will only be attained when man seeks it because it is seemly, and not in order to attain wealth or leadership or anything similar by it. These aforementioned [things] are the conditions by which, when they are in seemly acts, happiness is inevitably attained--if one performs them willingly and by choice, and if our choice of them is for themselves, and if that is in everything we do and at every moment of our lives. These conditions themselves must be in the affections of the seemly soul.

Good judgment also sometimes belongs to man by happenstance, for sometimes a man may acquire a true conviction unintentionally and without an art. Happiness is only acquired [Y. 52] by good judgment [Kh. 184] intentionally and by art, and when man is aware of how he judges what he judges. Man may have [good judgment] and be aware of it, but with respect to insignificant things and [only] at some times. Not by this amount of good judgment will happiness be attained; rather it will only be attained when good judgment belongs to man, and he is aware of how he judges everything that he judges and at every moment of his life.

Misery (*shaqāwa*) cleaves to man when the acts, affections of his soul, and judgment are the opposite of what has been said; that is when he performs unseemly actions voluntarily and chooses them in everything he does throughout his life; and

⁶ Literally "accidents," but "affections" seems more suitable here.

similarly [with respect to] the affections of his soul. And he will have bad judgment in everything that a man judges and at every moment of his life.

[5] We must now speak about that by which [Kh. 185] these three, i.e., the acts, affections of the soul, and judgment, come to be in the state by which happiness inevitably will be attained and that by which these three will be in the condition through which happiness inevitably will follow; and about that by which these three will be in the condition through which misery will cleave to us--so that we will turn from the latter and turn toward the former.

I say that every man from the beginning of his existence is provided by nature (*maftūr*) with a faculty by which his acts, affections of his soul, and judgment will be the way they should be. By this very same faculty [Y. 53] these three may also belong to him [H. 6] in a way they ought not to be. By this faculty he performs seemly acts and by means of this very same faculty he performs unseemly acts. The reason for this is that the possibility of man's performing an unseemly act is like the possibility of his performing a seemly one. By means of this [faculty] he can attain good judgment [Kh. 186] and by means of this very same [faculty] he can attain bad judgment. The situation of this faculty with respect to the affections of the soul is the same, for the possibility of those that are unseemly is like the possibility of what is seemly.⁷

Then, after that, there arises in man another disposition such that these three will be one of two things exclusively, i.e., either as they should be, i.e., only seemly, or as they should not be, i.e., only unseemly. However, the possibility of doing what is as it

⁷ See N.E. II.1.1103a15-25; also, al-Fārābī, *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 9.

should be will not be equal to the possibility of doing what is not as it should be, but one of the two will be more possible than the other.

[6] As for the faculty that man has at the outset by nature, man does not have to acquire it, and as for the other disposition, it only arises if man acquires it. This [latter] disposition is divided into [Kh. 187] two kinds: (1) one of them by which the judgment is either good only or bad only; (2) the other by which the acts and affections of the soul are either seemly only or unseemly only.

The kind by which the judgment is either good only or bad only is divided into two kinds, of which one of them is good judgment—which is called strength [Y. 54] of mind (*quwwat al-dhihn*), and the other of which is bad judgment—which is called weakness of mind (*du'f al-dhihn*) or foolishness (*balāda*).

The [kind] by which the acts and affectations of the soul are either seemly or unseemly is called moral disposition (*khuluq*). Moral disposition is that by which there arise from man fine (*hasana*) and unseemly acts.

[Kh. 188] Since the acts and judgment by which happiness is attained are in the conditions that were stated above, and one of [H.7] the conditions is that they be [so] with regard to everything and always, it follows that that from which acts and judgment arise with these conditions, be a disposition whose nature it is to be according to one of two things only, so that by it man can continually do what is seemly and [exercise] good judgment in everything.

Since the faculty with which man was created is such that one of the two things does not arise alone without the other, and the acquired disposition that arises after that is such that one of the two things arises from it only, it follows that the acts and

affections of the soul [Kh. 189-190] can only be from it, since happiness must be attained from it when we have strength of mind as a habitude (*malka*) that cannot disappear or [can only do so] with difficulty. Seemly character traits and strength of mind together [make up] human virtue (*faḍīla*), since the virtue of everything is that which causes it to attain goodness and perfection in itself, and causes its acts to attain goodness [Y. 55]. If both of these two are acquired, we acquire goodness and perfection in ourselves and in our acts; by them we become noble (*nubalāʾ*), excellent (*khiyāra*), virtuous (*fāḍilīn*). By means of these two things [Kh. 190] our path in life becomes a virtuous path, and our entire behavior becomes praiseworthy.

[7] Let us now begin with that by which we arrive at having good moral dispositions as a habitude, then let us follow [up the discussion] with that by which we proceed to acquire the power to grasp what is correct as a habitude--and I mean by "habitude" that it is such that it cannot disappear, or [can so] only with difficulty.

So we say that all moral dispositions, seemly and unseemly, are acquired. Man, when he has not attained a moral disposition, can attain one for himself. When his soul comes upon [H. 8] a certain thing in a certain moral disposition, [Kh. 191] either seemly or unseemly, he [may] move voluntarily to the contrary of that moral disposition. [Y. 56] And that by which man acquires the moral disposition or moves his soul to another moral disposition, is the habitual act.⁸ I mean by habitual act the repetition of an act of one thing repeatedly for a long time in closely successive times. And since the seemly moral disposition is also acquired by habit, it is necessary that we speak about that which, if we habitually repeat it, will cause us to acquire by it a seemly

⁸ For the role of habituation, see *K. al-Ḥurūf*, Part II, par. 115.

moral disposition and that which, if we habitually repeat it, will cause us to acquire by it an unseemly moral disposition.

[8] [Kh. 192] So I say that the things which, when we become habituated to them, provide us with a seemly moral disposition are the acts that belong to those having good moral dispositions; and those which provide us with unseemly moral dispositions are the acts that belong to those having bad moral dispositions. The situation with respect to those things by which one attains good moral disposition is the same as that regarding things by which one attains the arts. For the skill of writing is only gained when man becomes habituated to do what someone skillful at writing does, and the same is true of the rest of the arts. For being able [Y. 57] to write well is only produced by someone who has the skill of writing, [Kh. 193] and the skill of writing is attained when man has previously become habituated to the act of writing well. Writing well is possible for man before he attains the skill of writing by means of the power that he has innately. As for after he has attained the skill, it is by means of art. Similarly good action is possible for man, either before he has acquired a good moral disposition—in which case it will be by means of a potentiality he has innately—or after he has acquired it—in which case it will be by moral disposition. Thus when these very acts that are from moral dispositions are realized, when man becomes habituated to them before the attainment of moral dispositions, they cause one to attain moral dispositions.

The indication that moral dispositions are only attained from habituation is what we see happening in cities, [H. 9] for those who govern make the citizens good only by

means of habituating them to acts of goodness.⁹ [Kh. 194] As for which acts are good acts—and they are those acts by which, when we are habituated to them, we attain good moral disposition—we will now describe them.

[9] We say that the perfection of man in his constitution (*khalq*) is perfection of [his] moral disposition (*khuluq*). The situation with regard to the acts by which perfection of man's moral disposition is attained is like the situation of those things by which perfection of man's body is attained. [Y. 58] Man's perfection vis-a-vis his body is health. Just as when health is attained it must be preserved and when it is not it must be acquired, so too when seemly moral disposition is attained one must preserve it and when it [has not been attained] it must be acquired. And just as the things by which health is attained are attained when they are in a moderate condition, so too the acts by which seemly moral disposition is attained are only attained when they, too, are in a moderate condition. Just as when appetite is in moderation, health is attained, [Kh. 195] and when exertion is in moderation, health is attained, similarly when acts are in moderation, they produce seemly moral disposition. Just as when that by which health is attained deviates from moderation and the mean, health [itself] exists no longer, so too when acts deviate from moderation and [this] becomes a habit, a seemly moral disposition is not generated from them. Deviation from moderation is either toward being more excessive than is proper or more deficient—for when eating (*ta'ām*) is more than it should be or less than it should be, health is not preserved, and when exertion (*ta'ab*) is moderate, [Y. 59] the body becomes [Kh. 196] strong, but when [exertion] is more than it should be or less than it should be, strength wanes and

⁹ See *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 27; *Book of Religion*, par. 14.

weakness is preserved. Similarly, when acts deviate from the mean either by being greater than they should be or less than they should be, unseemly moral dispositions are acquired or preserved and seemly moral dispositions disappear. Just as moderation, by which health is attained, consists in its abundance or shortage, its strength and its weakness, its length and brevity of time, its excess and its deficiency, so too, following this example, moderation in acts consists of its abundance and shortage, strength and weakness, length and brevity of time.

Since moderation in everything is only when its abundance and shortage, strength and weakness is in a certain measure, and attaining everything in a certain measure is only when it is measured by a standard (*i^cyār*), we must speak about the standard by which we measure acts so that we attain the mean. I say: [Kh. 197] that the standard by which we measure acts is like the standard by which we measure what produces health. A standard that produces health consists of conditions of bodies for which it seeks health. For moderation in what provides health can only be achieved when it is gauged by bodies and is measured by the conditions of the body. Similarly, the standard of acts consists of the conditions corresponding to acts. Moderation can only [Y. 60] be achieved with regard to acts when gauged and measured by conditions corresponding to it. [Kh. 198] Just as the physician, when he wants to learn the moderate amounts by which health is attained, begins first by learning the temperament of the body whose health is being sought, and learns about the time, and about the man's craft, and the rest of the things that the art of medicine determines; and he makes a measure that provides health according to a measure that the temperament of the body bears, and that corresponds to the time of the cure. Similarly, when we wish to learn

the measure that is the mean in acts, we begin first to learn the time of the act and the place in which the act took place, and of whom was the act, and to whom was the act [done], and what was the act, and by what was the act [done], and for the sake of what and to what; and we make the act accord to the measure of each one of these. Then we will have hit upon the moderate act. And when the act is measured by means of all of these it is moderate, and when it is not measured by all of these, the act is excessive or deficient. [H. 11] Since the measures [Kh. 199] of these things are never one and the same with respect to excess and deficiency, the measures of moderate acts must not be always one and the same.

[10] We must now mention, by providing examples (*tamthīl*), what is acknowledged as being seemly among the moral dispositions, and we will mention the means of acts [Y. 61] generated from [the moral dispositions] and acquired from them, in order to lead the mind to what corresponds with what is most seemly here according to the types of moral dispositions and the acts that come from them.

So we say that courage (*shujāʿa*)¹⁰ is a seemly moral disposition; it is acquired by the mean in approaching frightening things and fleeing from them. Excess in approaching them results in rashness while deficiency in approaching them results in cowardice, which is [Kh. 200] an unseemly moral disposition. When these moral dispositions are acquired, these very actions come from them.

Generosity (*sakhāʿ*)¹¹ is produced from the mean in preserving money and in spending it. Excess in saving and deficiency in spending results in miserliness (*taqtīr*),

¹⁰ See N.E., III, vi, 1115a6ff. See also al-Fārābī's *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 16.

¹¹ See N. E., IV, i, 1119b22ff. See also al-Fārābī's *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 16.

which is unseemly; and excess in spending and deficiency in saving results in profligacy (*tabdhīr*). When these moral dispositions are acquired, these very actions come from them.

Temperance (*ʿiffa*)¹² arises from the mean in the pursuit of (*mubāsharat iltimās*) of pleasure from appetite or conjugal relations. Excess in this pleasure results in licentiousness [Kh. 201] and deficiency results in insensitivity to pleasure, which is blameworthy. When these moral dispositions are acquired, these very actions arise from them.

Wit (*ẓarf*)¹³ is a seemly character trait that arises from the mean of jesting. For man is compelled in his life to relax; and relaxation always consists of things whose excess is pleasurable or [at least] not painful. Jestng is something in which seeking plenty of it is pleasurable or [at any rate] not painful. [Y. 62] The mean results in wit, excess results in buffoonery; and deficiency [H. 12] results in boorishness (*fadāma*). Jestng is in what man says, [Kh. 202] what he does, and in what he practices. The mean in it is what is proper to the civilized (*hurr, ṭalq*) man,¹⁴ who is gentle (*wadīʿ*)¹⁵ in what he says and hears. To thoroughly determine these things is not the concern of this book; this has been studied thoroughly in another place.

¹² See N. E., III, xi, 1118b9ff. See also al-Fārābī's *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 16.

¹³ See N.E., IV, viii, 1127b35ff. See also al-Fārābī's *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 16.

¹⁴ Corresponds to the Greek *eleutherios* (civilized) or *eleutheros* (free).

¹⁵ Hyderabad ed. : *wariʿ* (pious, careful).

Man's truthfulness (*ṣidq*)¹⁶ with respect to himself only arises when he is accustomed to ascribe to himself goods that belong to him, in an unpretentious way as one should. And when man is accustomed to ascribe to himself goods that do not belong to him, the result is pretentiousness (*taṣannuʿ*), trickery (*makhraqa*) and hypocrisy (*murāʿāh*); and when he is accustomed to describe himself--wherever and however it be--as not [Kh. 203] possessing [virtuous qualities], he gains baseness (*takhāsus*).¹⁷

Amiability (*tawaddud*)¹⁸ is a seemly moral disposition that arises from the mean of man's meeting another and deriving pleasure through discourse or action. Excess in it results in flattery (*malaq*), which is an unseemly moral disposition, and deficiency in it results in timidity (*ḥaṣar*). If, in addition to that, he meets another and becomes distressed, he gains [Y. 63] unsociability (*sūʿ al-ʿishra*). In this manner we can consider other acts as either a mean, excessive, or deficient.

[11] [Kh. 204] Now we must speak about the device (*ḥīla*) by which we can acquire seemly moral dispositions. We say that we must first enumerate each moral disposition one by one and enumerate the acts arising from each one. After that it is necessary for us to consider and investigate [which] moral disposition we find in ourselves. Is that moral disposition which belongs to us from the beginning of our lives seemly or unseemly? The way to learn this is to consider it and investigate which action, if we do it, causes us pleasure in its wake, and which action, if we do it, causes

¹⁶ See N. E., IV, vii, 1127a14ff.

¹⁷ Hyderabad ed.: *tahāsūr* (distress, sadness).

¹⁸ See N.E., IV, vi, 1126b11ff. See also al-Fārābī's *Aphorisms of the Statesman*, par. 16.

us pain.¹⁹ If we learn this, we have investigated this act. Is it an act that comes from the seemly moral disposition [Kh. 205] or from the unseemly moral disposition? If it comes from a seemly moral disposition, [H. 13] we say that we have a certain moral disposition that is seemly and if it comes from an unseemly moral disposition, we say that we have an unseemly moral disposition. By this we learn which moral disposition we are heading toward.

Just as when the physician learns the condition of the body by means of things that follow from the conditions of the body, and if the condition that the body is aimed toward is a healthy condition, he devises (*ihtāla*) [a way] to preserve it for the body; and if what the body is aimed toward [Y 64] is a condition of illness (*saqam*), he uses a device to make that illness go away; [Kh. 206] similarly, when we are aiming in the direction of a seemly moral disposition, we devise [a way] to preserve it for ourselves, and when we are aiming in the direction of an unseemly moral disposition, we use a device to make it go away. If the unseemly moral disposition is a spiritual (*nafsāni*) illness, we must in removing the illnesses of the soul, follow the example of the physician in removing the illnesses of the body. Then, after that, we look into the unseemly moral disposition that we have found in our souls and [determine] whether it [inclines] in the direction of excess or deficiency. Just as when the physician, who has found the body excessive or deficient with respect to heat, returns it to the mean of heat specified by the art of medicine, so too do we, when we find in our souls excess or

¹⁹ See N.E. II.2.1104b3ff: "...we must take as a sign of someone's state his pleasure or pain in the consequence of his action."

deficiency with regard to moral disposition, cause ourselves to return to the mean as determined in this book.

Since learning the mean is, in the beginning, very difficult, [Kh. 207] one seeks a device for man to fix his character traits [at the mean] or very close to it, just as when it is difficult to fix the heat of bodies [at the mean] one seeks a device to make the body correspond to it or come very close to it. The device that fixes moral character at the mean [is this:] if we investigate the moral dispositions we have acquired, [and find that] they [deviate] in the direction of excess, we accustom ourselves to acts that are generated from [Y.65] its opposite--which is from the direction of deficiency. And if what we have found [deviates] in the direction of deficiency, we accustom ourselves to acts generated from its opposite, which is from the direction of excess. This we keep up for a long time. Then we consider and investigate which [H. 14] moral dispositions were produced. The result must be one of three conditions: [Kh. 208] (1) the mean; (2) inclining away from it; (3) inclining toward it. If the result comes close to the mean without our having gone beyond the mean towards the other opposite, we continue these very same acts longer, until we arrive at the mean. If we have gone beyond the mean to the other opposite, we perform the acts of the first moral disposition for awhile, then we consider the situation. And in general, whenever we find ourselves inclining in one direction, we accustom ourselves [to perform] acts in the other direction, and we do not cease doing this until we reach the mean or very close to it.

[12] As for how we know that we have made our moral dispositions correspond to the mean, we know by looking into the ease [with which we perform] the act generated from excess: [Kh. 209] is it easy for us to perform the act generated from

deficiency or not? For if we find it easy or close to it, we know that we have made ourselves correspond to the mean. The test of easiness is that we examine the two acts together, and if we do not [Y. 66] feel pain from one of them or feel pleasure from each one of them, or feel pleasure from one of them and do not feel pain from the other, or [feel] that the pain from it is very slight, we know that we find it easy or close to it.

Since the mean is between two extremes and it is possible for what is at the extremes to resemble the mean, it is necessary for us to be on guard [Kh. 210] that we do not alight upon the extreme that resembles the mean. An example of this is rashness (*tahawwur*), for it resembles courage, and squandering that resembles generosity, and buffoonery that resembles wit, and flattery that resembles affection, and baseness that resembles humility, and presumption that resembles sincerity. Moreover, since in these extremes there is something that inclines us toward it by nature, we must be on guard to learn about it. For example, we have a natural inclination to be deficient in confronting frightening things, and we have a natural inclination to stinginess. The best thing for us to be aware of is [H. 15] that extreme towards which we have an inclination. That, moreover, will resemble the mean. An example of that is joking; for the excess in using jest, since [Kh. 211] it is pleasurable or [at least] not painful, lightens its bearer [lifts the spirits?], so we incline towards it. Moreover, joking more greatly resembles wit than boorishness.

We must know the things we need to use as a tool [Y. 67] that makes our inclination from one side to the other or to the mean easier. For deliberation (*rawīya*) alone is sometimes not enough without a tool.

[13] So we say that performing unseemly acts only becomes easy for us because of the pleasure that we derive by performing the unseemly act. And we shun what is seemly when we have in mind that we will derive pain [from it], since we think that the aim in every act is pleasure.²⁰ This is what we aim for in everything we do.

[Kh. 212] Pleasures include what follows from what is sensed, such as the pleasures that come from what is heard, seen, tasted, touched, or smelled. And they include what follows from what is understood, such as the pleasure that follows upon deliberation, dominion, overcoming, and knowledge, and what is like this.²¹ We always appreciate more those pleasures that follow from what is sensed, and we believe that they are the aim of life and the perfection of living, because we have them from the beginning of our existence.²² Moreover, they include what is a cause of something necessary, either for ourselves or for the world. As for that which is [necessary] for us, it is nourishment by which we gain strength in our lives. As for what is necessary for the world, it is procreation. Because of this, we begin to think that [pleasure] is the aim of life, and that it is happiness. Moreover, what is sensed is better known to us and we grasp it more strongly [Y. 68] and are more capable of arriving at it. It is clear that by investigating and contemplating that it is what diverts us from most goods and that it is what hinders [Kh. 213] us from the majority of that by which happiness is attained. For when we see that pleasure in something sensed causes us to neglect a seemly act,

²⁰ See N.E. II.2.1104b10: "For it is pleasure that causes us to do base actions, and pain that causes us to abstain from fine ones."

²¹ See N.E., III, 1117b28: "...let us distinguish pleasures of the soul from those of the body." Aristotle includes love of honor and of learning.

²² See Aristotle, N.E. II, 1105a2.

we incline towards shunning what is seemly. And when it surpasses the power of man to reject these pleasures or to obtain the mean [H. 16] in them, then he has moved toward praiseworthy moral dispositions.

[14] The pleasures that follow upon acts—whether they are a pleasure in something sensed or a pleasure in something understood—either pertain to the present (*‘ājila*) or the future (*‘āqiba*);²³ and similarly pains. Each one of these pleasures follow acts in one of two ways: (1) either the character of the act is such that a pleasure or a pain always follows it—such as the pain that follows burning and the pleasure that follows intercourse—for the character of burning is that when it happens to an animal, pain and suffering follow; or (2) pain [Kh. 214] insofar as it is decreed by the Law (*shar‘īa*), follows the act without it being a characteristic of that act [that pain] always follows it [Y. 69], such as lashing for the fornicator, and death for the murderer. For seemly acts that bring pain in the present are inevitably followed by pleasure in the future and unseemly acts that bring pleasure in the present are inevitably followed by pain in the future.

It is necessary for us to deduce the pleasures and pains that follow from each act and to distinguish [the act] whose pleasure is in the present and whose pain is in the future, and that whose pain is in the present and whose pleasure is in the future. For when we incline towards an unseemly act [Kh. 215] because of a pleasure that we believe follows [it] in the present, and counter this pleasure with the pain that will follow it in the future, then we will refrain from the pleasure that prompts us to do what is unseemly. Therefore, it will become easy for us to turn away from what is unseemly.

²³ This may also be translated as “this world or the hereafter.”

And when we incline toward abandoning a seemly act because of a certain pain that comes to us in the present, and counter [it] with the pleasure that will follow [it] in the future, then we will refrain from the pain that makes us turn away from what is seemly. Therefore, it will become easy for us to do what is seemly. Moreover, when we incline towards something unseemly because of a certain present pleasure it has, we will counter that pleasure with the unseemliness it has with respect to the future.

[15] [Kh. 216; Y. 70] Among human beings is one who has good deliberation (*rawīya*) and the power of resolve to carry out what deliberation dictates.²⁴ [H. 17] Therefore, he is what we customarily call “worthy of being a free man” (*hurr*).²⁵ One who does not have either of these two [characteristics] is what we customarily call a “bestial man” (*insān bahīmī*) and “worthy of being a slave.” One who lacks the power of resolve only, but has good deliberation is what we customarily call the natural slave (*‘abd bi-l ṭab‘*).²⁶ This is what happens to those who profess to be scientists or try to philosophize. They belong to the rank of someone who is even beneath the first with respect to slavery. [The science] they profess becomes for them a dishonor (*‘ār*) and a disgrace (*subba*), since it is vain [and] of no use to them.

One who lacks good deliberation but has the power of resolve must have someone else deliberate for him. He either [Kh. 217] obeys what the other deliberates

²⁴ See N. E. VII. 21145b12.

²⁵ T. Irwin points out in the glossary to his translation of the *Ethics* (p. 404) that the free man (*eleuthērios*) for Aristotle is one who may be called “civilized” as opposed to “boorish” and “slavish.” The free man is one who has benefitted from an education in the virtues and has subdued his baser passions.

for him or does not obey. If he does not obey he is also bestial. If he does obey, he succeeds in most of his acts and because of this emerges from his slavery and participates with the free man.

Some of the pleasures that follow acts are better known and are more easily grasped by us, and some of them are more hidden. Those that are best known are those belonging to the present, and are [Y.71] sensed. It is the same with pain. Those [pains] that belong to the present and consist of something sensed are more apparent to us, especially if it is something painful that is set down by the law. The other pleasures and pains are more hidden; the most hidden of them is what is by nature, in the future, and conceived (*mafhūm*). Those which belong to the present and are by nature are less hidden--similarly those which belong to the future and are sensed.

As for free men, when they want to make a seemly act more easy and [want] to turn away from an unseemly one, they use pleasure and pain as a tool; for [Kh. 218] the most hidden [H.18] and the most evident [pleasures and pains] are of the same status to them. The pleasures inciting them to unseemliness are curbed by the pain—even if the pain most hidden—just as they are curbed by that which is more evident. That is because their good deliberation makes that whose nature it is hidden from most [men] have the same status as that which is most evident.

As for other people, this is not sufficient for them so their pleasures must be curbed by the most evident pain there can be. There may be some [Y. 72] people for whom it suffices when they incline to the unseemly because of present pleasure to be

²⁶ See N.E. VII.8.1150b20: "...the weak person deliberates, but then his feeling makes him abandon the result of his deliberation; but the impetuous person is led on by his feelings because he has not deliberated."

curbed by means of the imposition [of another] pleasure that leads to its abandonment, or the doing of its opposite. In this manner it is necessary to educate youths. If there are some for whom this is not sufficient, pain is added in order to put an end to the unseemliness and one makes the pain the most evident there can be. By this method, i.e., [Kh. 219] the last method, it is necessary to govern the bestial ones and that for whom the first method does not suffice. The most evident of the pleasures and pains are those which are attached to the senses. Those which are not attached to man's senses are those such as fear, sadness, anxiety, worry, and so forth.

Among the bestial ones are those for whom that [kind of] pain alone suffices and those for whom this alone does not suffice [unless] they are made to receive a pain to their senses. The most shameful of the senses in which man can feel pain is what follows from the sense of touch; after that, what follows from the sense of smell and the sense of taste; after that what follows from the rest of the senses. In this way, man can make the way to goodness easier and to abandon evil for himself and for others. This amount suffices in discussing these things. [Y. 73] The more thorough investigation of the discussion of these matters is pursued and has been thoroughly investigated in the science of politics.

[16] [H.19; Kh. 220] It is necessary for us to speak about good judgment, so we will first speak about good judgment and then the way in which we attain [it]. We say that good judgment is that by which we achieve and attain the various kinds of knowledge (*ma'ārif*) of all the things that man knows. These consist of two kinds: (1) those whose nature it is for man to know but not to do, rather to know only, such as our knowing that the world is created and that God is One, and our knowledge of many

of the causes of sensible things; and (2) the others whose nature it is for man to know and do, such as our knowledge that reverence of one's parents is good, that treachery (*khiyāna*) is unseemly, and that justice is seemly. And such as what is in the science of medicine by which health is gained.

As for that whose nature it is to be known and be done, [Kh. 221] its perfection is that it be done. When something is known which is not followed up by doing, the knowledge is vain [Y. 74] and there is no benefit (*jadwa*) in it. That whose nature it is for man to know but not to do, its perfection is to be known only.

Each one of these two kinds has arts that pertain to it. Knowledge of that whose nature it is to be known only is attained only by certain arts which have to do with knowledge of that which is known but not done. That whose nature it is to be known and done is also attained by other arts, for the arts also are of two kinds: (1) those by which we acquire knowledge (*maʿrifa*) only of the science (*ʿilm*), and (2) those by which we acquire knowledge of what [Kh. 222] is possible to do and the ability to do it. The arts which cause us to acquire the knowledge of what to do and the ability to do it consist of two kinds: (2a) that which man carries out in the cities, such as medicine, trade, agriculture and other arts of this sort, and (2b) that by which man investigates the best ways of life (*sayr*). By them he distinguishes what are fine deeds (*al-ḥasanāt*) and by them he chooses pious deeds and righteous acts, and acquires the ability to do them.

Each one of these three arts has a certain human aim, I mean that aim which is particular to man. The human aims are three: (1) what is pleasant; (2) what is useful;

(3) what is seemly.²⁷ What is useful is either useful with respect to the pleasant or useful with respect to the seemly. The aim of the arts that [H.20] are carried out in the cities is the useful. [The arts] by which one chooses the ways of life and gains the ability to do what [Kh. 223] one has chosen, their aim is the seemly. And the arts by which we attain that whose nature it is to be known only, its aim is also the seemly in that attaining knowledge of what is truly certain is inevitably seemly. So it results that the aim of all of the arts is either what is seemly or what is useful. Thus the arts are of two kinds: one kind whose aim is the attainment of what is seemly and one kind whose aim is the attainment of what is useful. The art whose aim is to attain what is seemly only is that which is called philosophy and it is [also] called wisdom without qualification. None of the arts whose aim is the useful is called wisdom without qualification, although sometimes some of them are called this by way of their [Y. 76] similarity to philosophy.

[17] [Kh. 224] Since what is seemly embraces two kinds [of knowledge]: (1) that which is knowledge only, and (2) that which is knowledge and action, the divisions of philosophy become two: that by which knowledge is attained of the existences which man cannot make / do, which is called theoretical, and (2) that by which knowledge is attained of things whose nature it is to be done and the ability to do those of them that are seemly, which is called practical philosophy and philosophy of the city.

Theoretical philosophy consists of three divisions of sciences: (1) Mathematics (*al-ta'ālīm*); (2) Natural Science (*al-'ilm al-ṭabī'ī*); and (3) Metaphysics (*'ilm mā ba'd*

²⁷ See N.E. II.2.1104b30: "There are three objects of choice—fine, expedient, and pleasant."

al-ṭabīʿīyāt). Each one of these three includes kinds of entities whose nature is to be known only.

As for the attainment of each one of the divisions of beings which each one of these three sciences includes, there is no need for us [to discuss them] here. Included in mathematics is the science of numbers, geometry, and optics. The philosophy of the city consists of two divisions: (1) that by which knowledge of the seemly acts and the moral traits from which the seemly acts proceed and the power over their causes and by which [H. 21] seemly things are attained by us. These are called the ethical arts. And (2) includes the knowledge [Y. 77] of things by which seemly things are attained for the inhabitants of the cities and the ability to attain these things for them and to preserve them. This is called political philosophy. These are a summary of the parts of the arts of philosophy. Since the objects of happiness are only attained when we have acquired the seemly things, and the seemly things are only acquired by the philosophical arts, thus it is necessarily by means of philosophy that we attain happiness, and this [philosophy] is attained by good judgment.

Since we only acquire the various types of happiness when seemly things have been acquired and since seemly things are only acquired when philosophy has been acquired, then it follows necessarily that it is philosophy by which we attain happiness; and this is what we acquire through good judgment. I say: that since philosophy is only attained through good judgment and good judgment is only acquired through the ability of the mind to grasp what is correct, this faculty of the mind is attained by us before all of these [other things]. Strength of mind is only obtained when we have a faculty by which: 1) we come to know and are convinced that what is true is certainly true; and (2)

come to know and avoid what is certainly false; and (3) come to know the false that resembles the true and not confuse it with [the true]; and (4) come to know [Kh. 227] what is true in itself but resembles the false, and do not confuse it with [what is really false], and are not deceived. The art by which we avail ourselves of this faculty is called the art of logic.

This art is that by which one comes to know: (1) true conviction, i.e. what it is; and (2) false conviction, i.e. what it is; and [Y. 78] (3) the things by which man progresses to the true; and (4) the things by which he deviates from the true; and (4) the things by which one conjectures that the true is false; and (5) that he imagines are false in the form of the true, and causes the mind of man [to form a] false [conviction] of what he is unaware; and (6) comes to know the way by which man removes false [conviction] from his mind when he happens to believe it without being aware; (7) and that by which he removes false [conviction] from others if they have fallen into [error] without [H.22] being aware of it, so that [when] man intends to quest an object in order to know it, he uses the things that [Kh. 228] cause him to come to know what is correct regarding the objects of his quest. When he comes upon a conviction regarding something in which there occurs to him a doubt as to whether it is correct or not correct, he can test it so that he will be certain whether it is correct or incorrect, and if he happens to be defective in that and falls into what is false without being aware of it, when he pursues it he will be able to remove the false from his mind. If that art has the disposition we have described, it follows necessarily that attention to [it] precedes attention to the other arts.

[18] Since some of the goods man possesses are more proper and some less proper to him, and the good most proper to man is his intellect--since the thing through which he becomes man is the intellect; and since man's intellect is what provides him with this art from among the goods, it so happens that this art provides the goods which are the goods most proper to man. [Kh. 229; Y. 79] The name "intellect" has been applied to man's apprehending the thing with his mind and may [also] be applied to the thing through which man's apprehension takes place. The thing called "intellect," through which man's apprehension takes place, is what the Ancients were accustomed to call "*nuṭq*." Reason may be applied to ordering (*nazm*) and expressing by speech (*billisān*); according to the people, the name "*nuṭq*" signifies this meaning and it is the commonly known meaning of this name.

According to the Ancients among the practitioners of this science, this name was applied to two meanings together. It can be truthfully attested of man that he is "rational" with two meanings together, I mean his verbal expression and his possession of something through which he apprehends; however, what the Ancients meant by their speech that man is rational is that he has something by which he apprehends what is true and knows it.

[H. 23] Since this art is of use in perfecting rational speech it is called the art of logic (*manṭiq*) and that by which man grasps what he seeks is also called the rational part of the soul. So the art of logic is that by which the rational part attains its perfection.

Since the name "*manṭiq*" may be applied to verbal expression, many people thought that the aim of this art was for man to gain knowledge (*maʿrifā*) through

correct verbal expression--but that is not the case; rather the art which uses the science of correct expression and ability in it is the art of grammar. [Y. 80] The cause for error with regard to this is that what is meant by the art of grammar and what is meant by this art share the same name only, for both of them are called the art of *manṭiq*; however, of these two meanings, that which the name "*manṭiq*" is meant to signify in this art is the first of them and not the other. [Kh. 231] Between the art of grammar and the art of logic there is a certain similarity and that is that the art of grammar provides the knowledge of what is correct with regard to what one utters and the capacity to be correct according to the custom of the people of a certain language--while the art of logic provides the knowledge of what is correct regarding what is intellectuated and the capacity for attaining what is correct regarding what is intellectuated. Just as the science of grammar rectifies the tongue to the point where one will only speak correctly according to the custom of the people of a certain language, similarly the art of logic rectifies the mind so that one will intellect only those things which are correct.

In general, the relationship between the art of grammar and utterances is like the relationship between the art of logic and the intelligibles and this is what consists of the similarity between the two. As for one of them being the [same as the] other or that one of them is included in the other, this is not the case.

[Kh. 232] It has become clear from this discussion how the path to happiness is and how are the ways to its path and the steps it is necessary to pursue in it. So its first step is the attainment of the art of [H.24] logic. Since this art is the first art, it is necessary that the practitioners of the sciences begin with it. [Y. 81] Every art can begin with it only when the one who investigates them has with him the things that are

used to reveal what this art contains. So we must know, first of all, the things which we must use to reveal what this art contains. What we use in every art to reveal those things whose nature it is that man [must] attain them before beginning the art are called the first principles (*awā'il*) through which it is possible for one to begin the art. [Kh. 233] The things which man has knowledge of include: (1) what he cannot not know, provided that he has a sound mind, such as that the whole of a thing is greater than some [part] of it and that man is not a horse. This is called common knowledge (*'ulūm mashhūra*) and well known principles (*awā'il muta'ārifa*). [Even] if man denies this verbally it is not possible for him to deny it mentally, for he cannot affirm what is contrary to it; and (2) includes what only some people and not others know. Among this [second group] is: (a) what can be easily known, and (b) that whose nature it is that it cannot be known by everyone, but can only be known through our deliberation (*fīkr*) and which we arrive at knowing by means of these axioms which no one can be without.

Since the art of logic is the first thing with which one begins on the path of the arts, [Kh. 234] it is necessary that the axioms with which one begins [Y. 82] be things that are previously known to man and which no one can be without. These are many things. But not anything whatsoever is used in any art whatsoever, but one kind is used in one art and another kind is used in another art. Therefore, it is necessary that one acquire [H. 25] those things that are proper for the art of logic only and set aside the rest, such as the rest of the arts.

All these things which no one can not know and which are present in man's mind from the very beginning of his existence are instinctive (*ghariziyya*) to him;

however, man may not be aware of how they came to be in his mind until, when [Kh. 235] he hears the utterance that signifies it, he then becomes aware that the[se things] were in his mind. Similarly, these things may be differentiated from one another in his mind so that the man sees with his mind each one of these things by itself (*'alā hiyāla*), so that when he hears the corresponding utterances that signify it, he will see them separate and distinct in his mind. Therefore, it is necessary first of all concerning those things about which he happens to be unaware or is unaware of how they are differentiated from each other, that he enumerate the utterances which signify them. Then he will become aware of them, and will see each one of them by itself. Many of [Y. 83] the things with which one can begin in the science of logic are not things that one is aware of as differentiated although they are present in man's mind. Hence it is necessary, when one intends to inform about them, to present the various kinds [Kh. 236] of utterances that signify the various kinds of intelligible meanings, so that when one becomes aware of these meanings and sees each one of them in its own right, one may thus acquire the meanings whose nature it is to be used to reveal this art.

[19] Since it is the art of grammar that includes the kinds of significant utterances, the art of grammar must be indispensable for learning (*wuqūf*) and pointing out (*tanbīh*) the first principles of this art. Therefore, we must take a sufficient measure from the art of grammar for alerting us about the principles of this art; or to enumerate properly the sorts of utterances which the grammarians customarily use to signify what this art includes; [or] if it happens that the users of the language do not have an art in which is enumerated the sorts of utterances which are [H. 26] in their language. Therefore, it is clear what [Y.84] was done in ancient times by way of including [Kh.

237] in logic things belonging to the art of language, borrowing from it a sufficient measure; but rather the truth is that what is necessary in order to facilitate instruction was used. Whoever follows another path has been negligent or careless of the order of the arts.

[20] Since our aim is to follow the order that the art requires, it is necessary for us to begin one of the books of first principles which, by enumerating the sorts of significant utterances, will make it easier to begin this art. Hence we must begin with it and make it follow this book.